With supply chains now extending into developing countries, time and again, working conditions in supplier factories have been found to be unsafe. In this study, we focus on factories in the Bangladesh ready-made garment (RMG) industry that supply to North American and European retailers. These retailers have adopted an innovative approach to improving the working conditions of supplier factories by forming consortiums. The consortium of North American retailers is the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (Alliance). The consortium of European retailers is the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (Accord). The central question addressed in this study is: How do working conditions in a supplier factory impact its trustworthiness as seen from a buyer's perspective? We characterize supplier factory working conditions in terms of three types of risks, namely, structural risk, fire risk, and electrical risk. Next, we examine the implications of each type of risk for supplier trustworthiness measured as the number of buyers contracting with the supplier factory. The empirical analysis is conducted using detailed archival data on safety inspection reports from Alliance and Accord. The results support the contention that buyers are sensitive to working condition risks in a supplier factory, i.e., as working condition risks in a supplier factory increase, its trustworthiness decreases; however, this relationship varies with the type of the risk. Specifically, among the three types of risks, fire and electrical risks are associated with decreased supplier trustworthiness, while structural risk has a marginal effect. Further, the negative relationship between working condition risks and supplier trustworthiness is moderated by the size of the supplier factory. That is, for a given level of risk, buyers perceive larger supplier factories to be more trustworthy, expecting them to take corrective actions toward improving working conditions, compared to smaller factories. The above findings highlight the marketplace implications of working condition risks in supplier factories and suggest that the competitiveness of a supplier factory in a developing country is inversely related to the level of working condition risks in the factory.
Introduction
Supply chains of goods and services increasingly span the globe (Pigors and Rockenbach 2016, Bartley 2007) . Concurrently, work involved with the production of goods and services, too, is increasingly distributed across firm and country boundaries (Sinha and Van de Ven 2005) . The global distribution of work to developing countries is largely driven by lower costs of labor and materials coupled with the _________________________________________ * All authors contributed equally to this work. This work is based on part of the second author's dissertation. availability of skilled labor necessary to perform relevant work in such countries (Miller 2015, Locke and Romis 2007) . Notwithstanding these benefits, designing and managing global supply chains whose reach extends into supplier factories in developing countries often involves the stark reality of substandard working conditions in such factories, often referred to as "sweatshops." Recent illustrative examples include the widely publicized building collapse and fires due to poor maintenance in Bangladesh readymade garment (RMG) factories (Greenhouse 2013) , routine overwork in Chinese electronic manufacturing units (Svensson 2012) , and inadequate worker safety procedures in Samsung's manufacturing unit in Brazil (Pearson 2013) .
In Bangladesh garment factories, the empirical setting for this study, retailers from North America and Europe, who are the buyers from the factories, have adopted an innovative approach towards improving the working conditions in these factories by forming consortiums. The consortium of North American retailers is the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (Alliance) . The consortium of European retailers is the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (Accord) . Alliance was formed in 2013 by a group of 26 large North American clothing retailers who developed and launched the Bangladesh Worker Safety Initiative, a binding, five-year agreement intended to be transparent, results-oriented, measurable and verifiable for improving safety in Bangladesh's RMG factories. Similarly, the Accord was formed in 2013 by 72 large mostly European clothing retailers to monitor supply chains and improve working conditions in Bangladesh's RMG factories (Evans 2015 , The Economist 2013 .
The formation of Alliance and Accord represents an innovative approach to addressing the social challenge of poor working conditions in supplier factories in three ways. First, compared to existing approaches that focus largely on self-monitoring by supplier factories or third-party audits (Distelhorst et al. 2016 , Porteous et al. 2015 , the objectives of Alliance and Accord are to establish working conditions standards and best practices in Bangladesh RMG industry. They do so by educating supplier factories through inspections and training efforts, and by providing financial support to the factories for carrying out corrective actions , World Bank 2015 . Second, unlike existing approaches, Alliance and Accord involve all stakeholders in the garment value chain -i.e., from supplier factories and buyer firms to consumers, government agencies, policymakers, and NGOs. The resulting ecosystem increases the transfer of ideas, standards and best practices among the stakeholders making improvement efforts "more effective, efficient, sustainable, or just" than existing solutions (Phills et al. 2008, p. 36) . Third, the increased transparency and public disclosure of working condition risks in supplier factories not only reduce heterogeneity in standards across factories but also promote greater awareness among factories and their stakeholders (Kraft et al. 2016) . Since their formation in 2013, the two consortiums have inspected the majority of supplier factories in the Bangladesh RMG industry and have released detailed safety and inspection reports on the working condition risks.
This study investigates the effect buyers have on factory working conditions for work that is distributed in a global supply chain. Toward this end, scholars have begun exploring the management of corporate social responsibility beyond temporal profit maximization in settings where business transactions transcend firm and country boundaries (e.g., Distelhorst et al. 2016 , Carroll et al. 2012 , King 2008 . Corporate social responsibility encompasses the notion that buyers need to conduct business "to do good, to do well, to do the right thing in the right way" (Carroll et al. 2012, p. 9) .
That is, buyers not only need to manage their internal business practices but also the business practices in supplier factories . Such a focus has significant implications for ensuring consumer confidence in the buyers' products, and subsequently, their profitability. While concerns about product quality have exposed buyers that source from supplier factories in developing economies to reputational harm -e.g., in the toy industry (Marucheck et al. 2011 ) and pharmaceutical industry (Gray et al. 2011), buyers are also subject to such harm when "dangerous, illegal, or otherwise problematic" working conditions in supplier factories are revealed (Short et al. 2015, p. 1) . Further, recent studies on consumers' valuation of corporate social responsibility practices indicate that consumers are willing to pay higher prices to firms (i.e., buyers) when they demonstrate higher levels of transparency in such practices (Kraft et al. 2016 , Hainmueller et al. 2015 . Therefore, the importance for a buyer to demonstrate corporate social responsibility through a focus on working conditions in supplier factories in developing countries cannot be overstated.
At the same time, with increasing globalization of supply chains and heterogeneity in working conditions across geographical locations, identifying suppliers that can safely and reliably deliver on their contractual obligations is a matter of fundamental importance to buyers (Beer et al. 2014 , Özer et al. 2011 , Wang et al. 2014 . During the economic exchange, a buyer's perception of a supplier as a trustworthy partner can not only reduce transaction costs and the complexity of formal contract design (Williamson 1985) , but more importantly, it can also reduce the risk of adverse supplier selection (Hoetker et al. 2007) . A relevant question then arises as to whether knowledge of working conditions in a supplier factory has implications for whether a buyer perceives a supplier to be trustworthy. More specifically, how do working conditions in a supplier factory impact its trustworthiness as seen from a buyer's perspective? This is the central question addressed in this study.
We focus on factories in the Bangladesh RMG industry that supply to major retailers in North America and Europe. Bangladesh plays a critical role in the RMG industry -it is the third largest exporter to the U.S., after China and Vietnam (Anner 2015) , and the second largest overall exporter in the world after China (Evans 2015) . In a recent McKinsey survey, nearly 90% of chief purchasing officers projected Bangladesh as the No. 1 sourcing "hot spot" over the next 5 years (Berg et al. 2011) . Currently, the Bangladesh RMG industry employs nearly 4 million mostly female workers (Mahr and Habib 2013) , and clothing accounts for 80% of total exports, at $22 billion (Evans 2015) . In terms of contribution to employment and overall GDP growth, Bangladesh's RMG industry sector continues to be the foremost industry sector within the country. The data for this study were collected from more than 1600 garment (supplier) factories located in Bangladesh through the Alliance and Accord consortiums. Using this data, we characterize risks related to working conditions in supplier factories in terms of three types, namely, structural risk, fire risk, and electrical risk. Next, we evaluate the impact of working condition risks on a fine-grained measure of supplier trustworthiness that captures the number of retailers (buyers) that have contracted with each supplier.
The empirical analysis is carried out using a fixed-effects negative binomial regression with robust standard errors. Controlling for unobserved heterogeneity in factory inspections across the two consortiums as well as observed heterogeneity in factory characteristics, the results lend support to the contention that buyers are sensitive to working condition risks in a supplier factory. That is, an increase in working condition risks in a supplier factory is associated with a corresponding decrease in supplier trustworthiness. However, such a relationship varies with the type of the risk. Specifically, among the three types of working condition risks, fire and electrical risks are significant in reducing supplier trustworthiness, while structural risk has a marginal effect. We also find that the negative relationship between working condition risks and supplier trustworthiness is moderated by the size of the supplier factory such that the negative relationship is reduced in larger supplier factories as compared to smaller supplier factories. This suggests that, for a given level of working condition risks, buyers perceive larger supplier factories to be more likely to take steps in improving their working conditions compared to smaller supplier factories. The above findings, taken together, provide nuanced insights into the marketplace implications of working condition risks in supplier factories, and highlight not only the sensitivity of the buyer-supplier relationship to such risks but also provide actionable guidance to supplier factories on how to manage working condition risks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the prior literature on corporate social responsibility and working conditions, identify gaps in the literature and discuss how our study addresses these gaps. In section 3, we develop hypotheses that link working condition risks to supplier trustworthiness and examine the moderating role of factory size on these relationships. In section 4, we discuss the data collection procedure. In section 5, we discuss the model specification and report the results of the empirical analysis to test the hypotheses. Finally, in section 6, we conclude the study with a discussion of the theoretical and practical contributions, limitations and directions for future research.
Corporate Social Responsibility and Working Conditions
The concept of corporate social responsibility is rooted in the idea that firms are responsible for managing economic and non-economic practices, and for creating shareholder value by meeting the needs of nonshareholding stakeholders (Pigors and Rockenbach 2016 , Guo et al. 2015 , Eccles et al. 2014 , Porter and Kramer 2011 . The concept further emphasizes that firms exist within a society with rights and responsibilities as society members to conduct their business in a responsible manner (Carroll et al. 2012 ).
Our review of the extensive literature on corporate social responsibility highlights the following five dimensions across which such responsibility can be exercised by a firm: (i) environmental dimension, (ii) social dimension, (iii) economic dimension, (iv) stakeholder dimension, and (v) voluntariness dimension (Carroll et al. 2012, p. 7-8) . Among these five dimensions, the stakeholder dimension is the focus of our study. Generally speaking, besides shareholders, a firm's stakeholders may include employees, customers, suppliers, local communities, regulators, and the general public (Besiou and Van Wassenhove 2015, Madsen and Rodgers 2015) . In the context of global supply chains, firms often interact with suppliers who may be located across country boundaries , Surroca et al. 2013 , Porter and Kramer 2011 . Therefore, working conditions in a supplier factory belong to the domain of corporate social responsibility management for firms.
The concept of working conditions can be categorized into wages (e.g., fairness, minimum standards) and non-wage working conditions (e.g., worker safety, hours, security, union environment) (Jayasuriya 2008) . Consistent with this view, Toffel et al. (2015, p. 7) highlight the importance of studying working condition issues in developing countries that include "child labor, forced or compulsory labor, working hours, occupational health and safety, minimum wage, disciplinary practices, treatment of foreign workers, and illegal subcontracting." These issues fall into three general sub-categories: labor selection (child, forced or compulsory), management practices (working hours, minimum wage, discipline, treatment of foreign workers, and illegal subcontracting), and facilities (occupational health and safety).
This study focuses on the third category, specifically the physical structure as it relates to the welfare of workers in supplier-owned and managed production facilities. In this study, we conceptualize working conditions in terms of worker safety in operational settings such as a supplier factory.
Worker safety in factories has become a topic of much attention in the popular press since the 2013 Rana Plaza building collapse tragedy in Bangladesh in which more than 1100 factory workers died and more than 2500 workers were injured. However, the operations and supply chain management literature, despite its origins and rich history in the study of factory operations and performance (e.g., Hopp and Spearman 1996 , Hayes and Wheelwright 1984 , Skinner 1974 , has provided limited attention to this topic with emerging studies focusing mainly on theoretical and anecdotal explorations of worker safety issues in supply chains (e.g., Besiou and Van Wassenhove 2015 , Guo et al. 2015 , Plambeck and Taylor 2015 , Brown 1996 . As Pagell et al. (2014 Pagell et al. ( , p. 1161 Brown's (1996) seminal call [for studies on workplace safety], operations management research that considers safety remains very sparse." One possible explanation for the paucity of research on worker safety in the operations and supply chain management literature could be that such a concept is often perceived as distant and disconnected from traditional operational performance metrics of efficiency and effectiveness (Das et al. 2008) . Second, with the rapid servitization of North American and European economies over the last two decades and significant offshoring of manufacturing jobs from these economies, concerns relating to worker safety in offshore supplier factories have often remained peripheral to the interests of the business community in these economies. Organizations continue to pursue prior practices in supplier evaluation and selection without deliberating about the particular circumstances surrounding the newly added stakeholders, like substandard worker safety in an international factory (Briscoe et al. 2015 , King 2008 . Third, from an empirical research standpoint, the availability of reliable objective data on worker safety issues in supplier factories has been scarce; while few factories conduct regular audits of working conditions and worker safety issues on their own, even fewer are willing to reveal such information for outside scrutiny .
A limited number of empirical studies in the operations management literature that have focused on worker safety issues have used primary data sources -e.g., surveys and interviews , de Koster et al. 2011 , Das et al. 2008 . These studies have focused on the linkage between (i) worker safety and the quality of firm outputs (e.g., Das et al. 2008) , (ii) worker safety and operational effectiveness (Pagell et al. 2015) , and (iii) organizational culture and worker safety ).
Additionally, Levine et al. (2012) use archival data on random Occupational Health and Safety Assessment (OSHA) inspections to examine their impact on injury rates and firm performance (measured using data on sales, payroll, employment, creditworthiness, and firm survival), and Lo et al. (2014) use archival data on firms' safety certification, consistent with OHSA guidelines, on safety incidents and operational performance (measured using data on sales growth, labor productivity, and profitability).
Taken together, these studies support the notion that improvement in working conditions positively contributes to the operational and financial performance of a firm .
It is worth noting, however, that the above empirical studies have examined the implications of working conditions from an intra-firm perspective, and do not take into consideration the notions that: (i) a significant volume of firms today operate within the context of a global supply chain, with buyer and supplier firms often located across country boundaries, and (ii) working conditions in supplier firms (e.g., factories) may have implications for the buyer-supplier relationship. Our study contributes to the emerging research on worker safety in the operations and supply chain management literature by examining whether buyers exercise corporate social responsibility in their transactions with suppliers by taking into consideration the working conditions in supplier factories . More specifically, we seek to understand how working conditions in a supplier factory influence buyer perception of supplier trustworthiness. In the following section, we identify and discuss the types of working condition risks examined in our study, describe the concept of supplier trustworthiness in global supply chains, and develop hypotheses that link these concepts.
Hypotheses Development

Working Condition Risks in Supplier Factories
Our study focuses on working conditions in supplier factories. We consider three types of risks related to working conditions in Bangladesh's RMG industry, namely, structural risk, fire risk, and electrical risk.
These risks present potential threats to worker safety and are the focus of factory inspections by Alliance and Accord. Our review of the consortium websites and relevant literature indicates that the two consortiums reached an agreement on using a common and consistent framework for conducting factory inspections and for evaluating the three types of working condition risks in Bangladesh's RMG factories  Fire Risk. The factory should be compliant with fire safety requirements and have protection from danger to life from effects of fire including smoke, heat, and toxic gasses created during a fire. The structural systems should be properly protected in the event of a fire and have fire resistance. There should be sufficient means of escape, in a manner that protects occupants. Fire protection systems should be installed, operated, and maintained in accordance with standards, and building occupants should be properly trained and aware of emergency evacuation procedures.
 Electrical Risk. The factory should be compliant with electrical safety requirements and have protection from danger to life from electrical hazards. The electrical system should be designed and installed in a way that protects the building occupants' health and safety. It should be maintained in a manner that is safe and ensures the system remains operational. Those responsible for operating and maintain the system should be properly licensed and trained.
Implications of Working Condition Risks on Supplier Trustworthiness
The notion of trustworthiness has its roots in the extensive literature on inter-organizational trust (e.g., Zaheer et al. 1998) and is sometimes used interchangeably with trust in this literature (Yamagishi 2011).
However, there are important conceptual differences between trustworthiness and trust as noted in recent studies on buyer-supplier relationships (Schilke and Cook 2015 , Beer et al. 2014 , Özer et al. 2011 , Yamagishi 2011 . The trustworthiness of a supplier captures a buyer's perception of whether a supplier can be relied upon to fulfill contractual obligations, and is represented in the form of realized actions or decisions taken by a buyer on supplier selection (Schilke and Cook 2015 , Beer et al. 2014 , Özer et al. 2014 , Yamagishi 2011 , Ben-Ner and Halldorsson 2010 , Szulanski et al. 2004 , Becerra and Gupta 2003 .
It is specifically a characteristic of a trustee (the supplier, in this case). Trust, on the other hand, captures the buyer's ex post assessment of supplier trustworthiness (Yamagishi 2011) , and refers to the extent to which the trustor (the buyer) believes that the supplier is honest and/or benevolent (Li et al. 2010, Dyer and Chu 2003) .
During an economic exchange, supplier trustworthiness is an important signal that allows buyers to evaluate a supplier's competency for executing a transaction (Williamson 1985) . Noting the relevance of trustworthiness in global supply chains, prior studies have investigated its antecedents (Ben-Ner and Halldorsson 2010, Becerra and Gupta 2003) in the context of buyer-supplier relationships (Beer et al. 2014 , Özer et al. 2011 , Voigt and Inderfurth 2012 . Additionally, studies focusing on the supplier perspective have found evidence that buyers' communication capability and professional knowledge may influence the extent to which suppliers perceive buyers' to be trustworthy (Zhang et al. 2011, Dyer and Chu 2003) . However, the extant literature is largely silent on supply-side factors and characteristics of the supplier environment that may influence supplier trustworthiness.
We propose that buyers perceive working conditions in supplier factories not only as an important dimension of corporate social responsibility but also as a factor critical to the operational performance of the supply chain. As a result, the presence of working condition risks in a supplier factory may negatively affect buyer perception of supplier trustworthiness. Such a relationship can manifest due to increased buyer apprehension regarding the potential for supply chain disruptions and reputation loss.
First, increasing levels of working condition risks can increase the potential for supply chain disruptions and affect a supplier's ability to reliably fulfill their production orders. Toward this end, recent studies (e.g., Pagell et al. 2015 , Das et al. 2008 ) note that working condition risks are often associated with workplace accidents, machine failures, and worker absenteeism, all of which can reduce the operational performance of the supply chain. With increasing focus on worker safety in factories in recent years and its potential benefits for operational performance, these findings suggest that buyers should be more likely to offer contracts to suppliers perceived as capable of fulfilling contractual obligations, thus reducing the likelihood of supply chain disruption (Wang et al. 2014 , Hill et al. 2009 ).
As a result, working condition risks in a supplier factory are likely to reduce the supplier trustworthiness and thereby reduce the likelihood of the supplier being selected by the buyer.
In addition, the presence of working condition risks can increase the potential that a buyer may incur a significant loss in reputation when information relating to poor working conditions in supplier factories is revealed to the public. Reputation is a key strategic concern for most buyers . Buyers seek to avoid reputational spillovers and liabilities arising from dangerous, illegal, and unethical behavior at supply chain factories (Distelhorst et al. 2016 . In recent years, buyers are increasingly volunteering to monitor working conditions in supplier factories and requiring suppliers to meet globally recognized standards of conduct (Distelhorst et al. 2016 , Guo et al. 2015 , Plambeck and Taylor 2015 , Porteous et al. 2015 . For example, third-party non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (e.g., Fair Labor Association) monitor supplier compliance with buyers' "code of conduct" (Briscoe et al. 2015 , Reisinger 2012 . Such moral obligations toward the workers in supplier factories represent an important facet of the corporate social responsibility for buyers.
Taken together, the above arguments suggest that working condition risks in a supplier factory have the potential to reduce supplier trustworthiness. Improvements in working conditions can be viewed as a unilateral supplier investment before the contractual relationship is set. Such investment signals the supplier trustworthiness in the supply chain (Beer et al. 2014, Barney and Hansen 1994) . This is due to the anticipated effects of risk on operational performance as well as the potential reputation hazards associated with adverse supplier selection. Therefore, we propose the following set of hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1a: Structural risk in a supplier factory is negatively associated with supplier trustworthiness, ceteris paribus.
Hypothesis 1b: Fire risk in a supplier factory is negatively associated with supplier trustworthiness, ceteris paribus.
Hypothesis 1c: Electrical risk in a supplier factory is negatively associated with supplier trustworthiness, ceteris paribus.
Moderating Effect of Supplier Factory Size
Prior studies have identified factory size as a critical factor in business operations that affects corporate social responsibility management (e.g., Tang et al. 2015) , business growth and factory expansion (e.g., Moatti et al. 2015, Audia and Greve 2006) , alliance formulation (e.g., Mindruta et al. 2016) , and new product development (e.g., Bayus 2013 , Subramanian 2013 ). In addition, factory size has been explored in research on managing consumer trust (Teo and Liu 2007, Jarvenpaa et al. 1999 ) and risk-taking behavior (Audia and Greve 2006, Walls and Dyer 1996) . All else remaining constant, we argue that the relationship between working condition risk and supplier trustworthiness can depend on the size of the supplier factory. This moderation effect can manifest in three ways.
First, in contrast to smaller suppliers, larger suppliers are likely to have more resources available for addressing working condition risks identified during inspections (Besiou and Van Wassenhove 2015, Pagell et al. 2015) . Further, higher existing levels of resources may enable larger factories to acquire and leverage additional resources for addressing working condition risks from financial institutions more easily than smaller factories (Sarkar et al. 2001) . At the same time, larger factories, given their scale and complexity, are more likely to have formalized structures (e.g., dedicated human resource specialists, corporate social responsibility departments) and organizational systems in place compared to smaller factories (Sila 2007 , Sørensen 2007 , which may enable the efficient tracking and remediation of working condition risks in the factories (Distelhorst et al. 2016 , Perry et al. 2015 . To this end, a recent report by the US garment retailer Gap Incorporated (GAP Inc. 2016) notes that its larger suppliers in developing economies tend to "actively monitor their labor practices, provide health and safety training to workers,"
while Perry et al. (2015, p. 742) Second, with increasing size, the negative publicity of working condition risks in supplier factories may not easily transfer to buyers. This is because, with increasing supplier size, status differences between buyers and suppliers decrease and responsibilities toward ensuring safe working conditions are more equitably distributed between the contracting parties (World Bank 2015). Smith (2013) notes that, given their visibility in the local community, larger supplier factories are more likely to be under intense scrutiny and pressure from both the stakeholders and the local government to engage in socially responsible operations. A buyer is, therefore, less likely to have the sole obligation for improving working conditions in a large supplier factory, as the supplier is expected to contribute toward this effort. Finally, given that larger factories tend to have higher reputation capital and benefit from existing reputational advantages during supplier selection (Dineen and Allen 2016) , this may dilute the negative signaling effects of the working condition risks on buyers. In such a case, a buyer has a lower perception of working condition risks in a larger supplier factory. Based on the above arguments, we propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: The negative association between the three risk types -structural, fire, and electrical -and supplier trustworthiness is moderated by the size of the supplier factory, ceteris paribus. That is, as the supplier's factory size increases, the strength of the negative association decreases.
In addition to the above hypotheses, we explore contextual factors associated with the supplier factory building that may influence a buyer's evaluation of supplier trustworthiness such as, i) whether a supplier factory consists of one or multiple buildings, and ii) whether the supplier factory is located in building(s) involving other factories, commercial (e.g., banks, shops) or residential properties. These factors closely relate to the notion of supply chain resilience and design for safety in a supplier factory (Sáenz and Revilla 2014) . Following the Rana Plaza tragedy which involved the structural collapse of a building involving multiple factories as well as commercial and residential properties 1 , the focus on physical attributes of a supplier factory building has received greater attention in the popular press 1 Our review of the specific details regarding the Rana Plaza tragedy indicate that it occurred in a building that housed four distinct supplier factories, multiple retail shops and a bank (Al-Mahmood and Smithers 2013). (Gerzema 2013 , Kapner et al. 2013 . We surmise that while the presence of multiple buildings for a supplier factory can minimize the potential for a production disruption in one building affecting production in another building, the presence of multiple factories and/or heterogeneous properties within a single building can compromise the structural integrity of the building as well as efforts to address working condition risks in the building. We, therefore, examine the role of these factors on supplier trustworthiness in our analysis.
Method
Data
To empirically test the proposed hypotheses, we analyze data from safety inspection reports released by We downloaded all available inspection reports (typically in pdf format) from each consortium website in July 2015-specifically, inspection reports on 621 factories from the Alliance website and 1005 factories from the Accord website, resulting in 1626 factories in our sample. To extract data from a report, we first converted the report into a rich text format data. Subsequently, we converted the rich text format data into a number format for analysis using an R programming script. This process of extracting data from inspection reports allowed us to obtain data regarding specific violations on working condition risks, factory characteristics such as inspection date, location (i.e., city, whether located in special economic zones), building characteristics (e.g., whether housed in a multi-factory or a multi-purpose building), and the number of buyers for each factory. We used a similar approach to retrieve information on factory age and detailed factory addresses from Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) and Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers & Exporters Association (BKMEA).
Coupling the zip code list from Bangladesh Post Office and geospatial information from Google Maps, we identified additional location characteristics for each factory (e.g., whether the factory is located in a specific industrial area or an economic zone) that may impact a buyer's decision to contract with a supplier factory. We note here that the analyzed sample is smaller than the number of unique factories due to: (i) partial (incomplete) inspections, and (ii) missing values for some variables.
Dependent Variable
Supplier Trustworthiness. We measure supplier trustworthiness as the number of buyers contracted with the supplier's factory. That is, the greater the number of buyers contracted with a supplier factory, the greater the trustworthiness of the supplier. This measure of trustworthiness is similar to that used in the online auctions literature (e.g., Huck et al. 2012 , Hergert 2007 where seller (supplier) trustworthiness is often represented in terms of the number transactions successfully executed by the seller. Further, our measure of supplier trustworthiness is consistent with prior studies that highlight contracts governing inter-organizational relationships as an important signal regarding a trustor's perceptions of its partner's trustworthiness (e.g., Schilke and Cook 2015, Barney and Hansen 1994) . While a greater number of buyers for a supplier does not necessarily guarantee profitability, there is evidence of positive correlation between a supplier's trustworthiness and its financial performance. For example, Beer et al. (2014) argue that buyers pay attention to a supplier's investments to gauge the supplier's intentions and determine whether or not a supplier is trustworthy. They analytically show that a supplier's profitability is likely to increase when buyers perceive the supplier to be trustworthy. In addition to financial implications, there are several distinct benefits for suppliers when they are perceived as trustworthy by a buyer:
 Reputation Benefit: Given that the buyers in our sample represent a group of well-established and big-name retail companies in North America and Europe, an increase in the number of buyers for a supplier reflects that: (i) a supplier has an ongoing business relationship with a greater number of established retail buyers, and (ii) is perceived by these retail buyers to be competent and capable of fulfilling contractual obligations as per agreed upon.
 Greater Flexibility: From a manufacturing flexibility standpoint, an increase in the number of buyers suggests that a supplier's production processes and production technology may have the flexibility to accommodate the varying requirements of multiple buyers (Krause et al. 2007, Swamidass and Newell 1987) . This, in turn, can signal the supplier's competitiveness to a buyer (Gereffi and Frederick 2010) , thereby increasing the supplier's attractiveness and the likelihood of survival.
 Greater Negotiating Power: All else remaining constant, more buyers for a particular supplier in a competitive market ensures that the supplier's continuing existence and growth is not tied to or constrained by the fortunes of one or select few buyers. As such, more buyers means more negotiating power for the supplier.
All supplier factories in our sample have a contract with at least one buyer. Additionally, the number of buyers per factory ranges from 1 to 19, with a mean of 3.21 and standard deviation of 2.71.
Independent Variables
We construct measures for the three types of working condition risks in a supplier factory based on the inspection reports from Alliance and Accord. The working condition violations identified in the inspection reports were explicitly reported by risk type and were audited and validated by additional independent inspections. After obtaining data from the inspection reports, we first develop a count measure for each risk type in a supplier factory. Next, to reduce skewness in the distribution of the count measures, we apply a log transformation for each measure. Despite the agreement in measurement standards and inspection guidelines by the consortiums, we recognize the possibility that unobserved heterogeneity across consortiums in the inspection processes. For this reason, and to ensure that our results are robust to such heterogeneity, we normalize the risk by each consortium and include a fixedeffect for each consortium in our analyses. We elaborate on the measurement of the working condition risks below.
Structural Risk. The inspection reports from both Alliance and Accord specify the potential safety issues associated with the physical structure of a factory as well as the integrity and performance of the structural factory components (e.g., walls, concrete elements, load carrying beams 
Control Variables
In addition to the independent variables above, we include a number of controls related to factory characteristics, as identified below.
Multi-building. Factories in the Bangladesh garment industry often occupy two or more buildings.
This distribution is reflected in our sample where approximately 41% of the factories are located in two or more buildings. To account for this heterogeneity across factories, we created a dummy variable that is coded as '1' if a factory has more than one building or '0' otherwise.
Multi-factory/Multi-purpose Building. Housing multiple factories in one building may affect the extent to which working conditions in a given factory are under the control of the factory manager; often, working conditions within a factory may depend on conditions in another factory within the same building. Additionally, a building that is characterized as a multi-purpose building (e.g., including residence units as well as a garment factory) may indicate the possibility that it was not designed for manufacturing work. To control for these differences across factories, we created a dummy variable that is coded as '1' if a factory is housed in a multi-factory and/or a multi-purpose building or '0' otherwise.
Joint Factory. Combining the inspection reports from Alliance and Accord, we find that some factories allow inspections by both consortiums. These factories may garner higher trustworthiness from the two groups. To control for such heterogeneity across factories, we created a dummy variable that is coded as '1' for a joint factory or '0' otherwise.
Factory Age. The age of a factory may indicate its level of production maturity and capabilities in garment production, i.e., older factories may have a proven record in garment manufacturing. On the other hand, newer factories may be more likely to use modern infrastructure and machinery, and may be housed in newer buildings. As a result, the age of a factory may have implications for supplier trustworthiness. Therefore, we control for this variable in our analysis (based on the year a factory was established). The descriptive statistics show the average age of factories to be 12.77 years, with a median age of 11 years. The maximum age of a factory in our sample is 34 years.
Area Division. A majority of the factories in our study sample are located in the two largest cities in Bangladesh: Dhaka (85%), Chittagong (14%), and others (1%). Dhaka is the capital of Bangladesh, while
Chittagong is a port city. Differences in geographical location, size, and development progress between cities may create differences in transportation and logistical characteristics and influence the extent to which factories in a given city are considered attractive to buyers. Therefore, we create a dummy variable that is coded as '1' if a factory comes from Dhaka, and '0' otherwise.
BSCIC Region. Bangladesh Small and Cottage Industries Corporation (BSCIC,
http://www.bscic.gov.bd/) is a government-supported project that provides medium-and long-term loans to small industries, either directly or through a consortium of commercial banks. BSCIC also provides assistance in other matters related to the development and expansion of small and cottage industries.
Based on the factory address, we use a binary variable that is coded as '1' if a factory comes from a BSCIC region, and '0' otherwise. Our sample has 105 (11.2%) factories from the BSCIC region. compared to an earlier inspection. To control for these differential effects of inspection date, we measure the number of days since the Rana Plaza tragedy for each factory inspection and include it in our analysis. The estimation results using the negative binomial regression specification with consortium fixed effect are presented in Table 2 .
EPZ
Empirical Results
Model Specification and Results
Insert Tables 1 and 2 here
To study the effects of working condition risks on the dependent variable, we first include the control variables in the base model (M1). Building upon this model, we include structural, fire, and electrical risk variables and their interactions with factory size in the subsequent models (M2-M4). Finally, in the full model (M5), we include the interactions between all risk variables and factory size. The variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each predictor variable in the above models is less than 2, suggesting that multicollinearity is not a serious concern. The explanatory power of the full model is assessed by pseudo R 2 values; the Cox and Snell R 2 is 0.50 and the McFadden R 2 is 0.393, suggesting high explanatory power.
All hypotheses tests are reported based on the full model. We report one-tailed results for hypotheses tests and two-tailed results for the control variables.
We first focus on the control variables in the full model and interpret the results associated with these variables. We find that factory size has a significant positive effect (̂= 0.43; < 0.001) on supplier trustworthiness. This indicates that, on average, larger factories are associated with higher levels of trustworthiness from the buyers' perspective compared to smaller factories. Similarly, the significant positive effect of joint factories (̂= 0.31; < 0.001) on supplier trustworthiness suggests that factories that open themselves to inspection by both Alliance and Accord are seen favorably by buyers.
We find a negative effect of multi-factory or multi-purpose buildings (̂= −0.36; < 0.001) on supplier trustworthiness. That is, buyers are less likely to contract with a supplier when the supplier's factory shares its building with other factories or is located along with residential or commercial properties in the same building. As noted earlier, this could be due to the fact that buyers may perceive multi-factory/multi-purpose building to present a safety hazard for workers due to significant differences in construction standards across residential/commercial properties and factories involving heavy machinery loads (Gerzema 2013) . For example, in a building originally designed for residential or commercial activities, the repeated use of industry-strength electricity generators (during power cuts) can weaken the overall structural integrity of the building. Additionally, the nature and extent of working condition risks and efforts to remediate them may differ across factories within a building, thereby compromising the safety of workers within a building. The observed relationship in our analysis is consistent with recent articles in the popular press that focus on factory building characteristics in the Bangladesh RMG industry as an important consideration that accounts for worker safety during the initial set-up of a factory (Gerzema 2013 , Kapner et al. 2013 ).
Our analysis also suggests that factories with more than one buildings (̂= 0.27; < 0.001) are positively associated with supplier trustworthiness. This finding suggests that buyers may value the reduced risk of production disruption-i.e., production at other facilities may continue when safety issues halt production in one building. Overall, the two findings related to characteristics of multiple buildings and multi-purpose buildings highlight their critical role in affecting supplier trustworthiness in the Bangladesh RMG industry context.
Focusing on the main effects of working condition risks in the full model, we find that fire risk has a significant negative association (̂= −0.06; < 0.05) with supplier trustworthiness, holding all other variables constant. Hypothesis 1b is supported. This result suggests that, with a one unit increase in the measure of fire risk, the number of buyers is expected to decline 6%. Further, we find that electrical risk also has a significant negative association (̂= −0.14; < 0.001 ) with supplier trustworthiness, supporting Hypothesis 1c. This result indicates that, with a one unit increase in the measure of electrical risk, the number of buyers associated with a factory will decline by 14%. These main effects are consistent across Models 2-4. The main effect of structural risk is negative and significant in Model 2, but only marginally significant in the full model, thereby suggesting only weak support for Hypothesis 1a.
Regarding interaction effects, we find that factory size has significant positive interaction with fire risk (̂= 0.11; < 0.001) and electrical risk (̂= 0.07; < 0.05). The positive interactions indicate that the negative main effects of the two types of working condition risks on supplier trustworthiness are lessened with increasing supplier factory size. In contrast, the interaction between factory size and structural risk is not significant. To enable an intuitive understanding of the interaction effects, we present interaction plots -see Figure 1 below. We observe that the joint effects of working condition risks and factory size on the dependent variable -supplier trustworthiness -vary across the different risk variables.
Specifically, while fire risk and electrical risk have negative associations with the number of buyers for a supplier factory, the negative associations are significantly dampened for larger factories.
Insert Figure 1 below
We further apply a Generalized Additive Model (GAM) approach to obtain more descriptive analysis and an in-depth examination of the interaction between working condition risks and factory size. We specify the GAM with a negative binomial model and report the results in Table 3 . We find that the smoothed terms between factory size and the three working condition risks are significant in Models 1-3.
In the full model, fire risk and electrical risk demonstrate significant interaction with factory size, while the smoothed term between structural risk and factory size is marginally significant. The full model explains 41% of deviance, reaffirming the significant explanatory power of our predictors in determining supplier trustworthiness.
Insert Table 3 here
Additional Analysis and Robustness Checks
We carried out multiple additional analyses using alternative specifications of our estimation model to test the robustness of our results.
First, we identify duplicate inspections by both Alliance and Accord in 23 factories to examine the inspection coherence between the two consortiums. We find that the correlation among measures of fire and electrical risks across the two consortiums is very high-i.e., 0.69 (p<0.01) for fire risk and 0.70 (p<0.01) for electrical risk, but only 0.09 (p<0.10) for structural risk. As a robustness check, to determine if duplicate inspections impact our observed results, we conduct subgroup analysis with data from Alliance only, Accord only, and data without duplicate inspections (i.e., dropping the latter inspection for a factory). The results, shown in Table 4 , indicate that the analysis with Accord data and the analysis without duplicate inspections are consistent with the main analysis. In the analysis with Alliance data, we do not find significant results for some of the hypothesized effects. However, their signs are similar to our main analysis. Overall, the sub-group analyses are consistent with our findings from the main analysis.
Second, given that the dependent variable is a count variable and that a number of factories in our sample have only one buyer, it is plausible that the results may be influenced by such distributional characteristics. To address this concern, we ran the analysis using the zero-inflated negative binomial regression specification and find results consistent with our main analysis. Results from this analysis are included in Table A These pairwise correlations suggest that a factory that performs poorly on the health and safety dimension also has other non-compliance concerns. Further, they suggest that our measures of working condition risks are representative of the overall levels of non-compliance risks in a supplier factory.
Fourth, we collected additional data from the Department of Inspection for Factories and Establishments (DIFE) website in Bangladesh (www.dife.gov.bd) to explore potential surrogate measures relating to factory size. We identify three additional variables relating to the supplier factories that can be used as controls for various aspects of factory size: number of machines in a supplier factory, total factory square footage, and number of floors/stories associated with the factory. A review of the correlation matrix in Table A -2 in the online appendix indicates significant positive correlations between these variables and our existing measure of factory size (number of workers). Subsequently, results following the inclusion of these additional variables are consistent with our original findings regarding the effects of factory size and are included in Table A -3 in the online appendix.
Finally, we conduct robustness checks by carrying out: i) analysis with risks that are normalized by factory size (Table A-4 in the online appendix); ii) sub-group analysis based on factory size (Table A-5 in the online appendix); iii) analysis with a quadratic term for factory size (Table A-6 in the online appendix); iv) analysis with alternative measures of supplier trustworthiness (Table A-7 in the online appendix). These analyses provide further evidence that the relationships between working condition risks and supplier trustworthiness are consistent with those from the main analysis.
Discussion
Summary of Findings
This study was motivated by the recognition that, notwithstanding the benefits of low cost and skilled labor, designing and managing global supply chains that extend into supplier factories in developing countries often involves contending with unsafe working conditions in such factories. The well-publicized building collapse and fire in Bangladesh ready-made garment (RMG) factories in 2013 are illustrative of the unsafe working conditions. In response, retailers from North America and Europe sourcing from garment factories in Bangladesh adopted an innovative approach to improving working conditions in the factories by forming two separate consortiums: Alliance (a consortium of North American retailers) and
Accord (a consortium of European retailers).
The results of analysis of data from the factory inspection reports of Alliance and Accord indicate that working condition risks in supplier factories-namely, structural risks, fire risks, and electrical risks, significantly impact supplier trustworthiness. Specifically, the results indicate that fire and electrical risks play a significant role in reducing supplier trustworthiness; however, we do not find consistent support for the impact of structural risk on supplier trustworthiness across the models we estimated. The above results, taken together, highlight the differential effects associated with working condition risks and suggest that buyers perceive the potential for supply chain disruptions and reputation loss to be greater from electrical and fire risks, compared to structural risks (Plambeck and Taylor 2015, Short et al. 2015) . Beyond this explanation, the lack of consistent support for the effects of structural risk on supplier trustworthiness raises the possibility that current inspection practices relating to structural risk by both Accord and Alliance may not be sufficiently detailed or understood by buyers in a way that affects their rationale for selecting a supplier. In contrast, the consistently significant effects of the building characteristic variables-i.e., multi-building and multi-factory/multi-purpose-on supplier trustworthiness suggest that buyers may consider these characteristics to be more visible and stronger signals of structural risk.
Our findings further suggest that the negative consequence of working condition risks on supplier trustworthiness are moderated by factory size. Specifically, both electrical and fire risks have significant positive interaction with factory size. That is, while increasing levels of electrical and fire risks are likely to reduce supplier trustworthiness, this relationship becomes attenuated as the size of the supplier factory increases. A potential explanation for this result may be that suppliers with larger factories are perceived to have more resources for addressing working condition risks. Further, they are perceived to devote greater effort toward exercising corporate social responsibility and maintaining long-term relationships with buyers, compared to smaller suppliers (Pagell et al. 2015) . However, factory size is not significant with respect to the relationship between structural risk and supplier trustworthiness, reinforcing the point that current evaluations of structural risk may be less likely to be understood by buyers in a way that affects their perception of a supplier.
Contributions to Theory and Practice
This paper makes significant contributions to research and practice related to supplier-buyer relationship management in a global supply chain that extends into a developing country where factory working conditions cannot be assumed to be safe. First, our study echoes the call from the extant literature that firms are expected to "assume important and integral social, psychological, and ecological responsibilities" (Ødegaard and Roos 2014, p. 2205) and establish "socially responsible operations" (Besiou and Van Wassenhove 2015, p. 1390) . Further, firms need to have demonstrated empirical evidence of integrating workplace safety measures into operations practices (Distelhorst et al. 2016 , Guo et al. 2015 , Brown 1996 . We identify the effectiveness and limitation of current corporate social responsibility practices during the initial supplier selection before buyers can manage responsible practices after the relationship is built (Distelhorst et al. 2016 , Porteous et al. 2015 , Locke and Romis 2007 . In sum, firms need to improve their corporate social responsibility (Carroll et al. 2012) , evaluate the safety for workers , Lo et al. 2014 , and develop a responsible sourcing strategy and practices across firm and country boundaries (Distelhorst et al. 2016 , Kraft et al. 2016 .
Second, our study contributes to the supply chain risk management literature which has highlighted that working conditions in supplier factories in developing countries should be an important consideration in global sourcing (Sodhi 2015 , Chopra and Sodhi 2014 , Robertson et al. 2009 , Jayasuriya 2008 . Specifically, our findings indicate that, in the context of the Bangladesh garment industry, buyers from developed countries do value better working conditions in a supplier factory given the potential implications for supply chain disruptions and reputation loss, and that evaluation of working conditions influences the likelihood that a buyer will contract with a supplier. Therefore, our study highlights the implication of improving working conditions by demonstrating the consequences of working condition risks on supplier trustworthiness. Our findings are a contribution to the literature on workplace safety management and operational performance that is premised on the notion that safe working conditions are essential to leveraging human capital and potentially contributing to operational performance ).
Third, our study findings indicate that while buyers (e.g., North American and European retailers) demonstrate corporate social responsibility by accounting for working conditions in supplier factories, specific contingencies in the factory environment may moderate the extent to which buyers exercise corporate social responsibility. Specifically, our results show that perceptions of working condition risks are moderated by factory size, with decreased perceptions of risks in the context of larger factories compared to smaller factories. This provides support for our arguments that larger factories may be perceived to be more active in remediating working condition risks due to greater availability of resources and/or the presence of formalized structures and explicit organizational systems (Distelhorst et al. 2016 , Sila 2007 . In sum, our study findings lend credence to arguments from the literature that the extent to which buyers exercise corporate social responsibility in global supply chains may be dependent upon the specific characteristics of the supplier factories (Besiou and Van Wassenhove 2015) .
Beyond the theoretical implications, our study findings have actionable implications for both buyers and suppliers in the Bangladesh garment industry. From the buyer perspective, their sustained participation in industry-wide consortiums (such as Alliance and Accord) aimed at improving worker safety in supplier factories sends a clear signal to suppliers about the importance of maintaining acceptable safety standards in their factories. This, in turn, reduces the potential for supply chain disruptions and reputational losses that can occur due to supplier events. At the same time, buyer participation in consortium efforts also establishes a level-playing field where buyers compete with each other without compromising the safety of workers in supplier factories. From a supplier standpoint, our study findings demonstrate that improving their factory working conditions can reduce buyer concerns about related risks and translate into greater potential for contracting with buyers. That is, buyer selection of suppliers while accounting for such risks signals to suppliers that improvement in working conditions can have beneficial financial consequences. Further, greater efforts should be expended toward the regular maintenance of factories, specifically in areas that minimize fire and electrical risks for workers.
Taken together, our findings imply to both buyers and suppliers that "safe" factory operations are not an oxymoron , and indeed, such operations present sustainable benefits for both sides.
Finally, findings from our study have the potential to inform policy and decision-making at the governmental level in Bangladesh (Besiou and Van Wassenhove 2015) , and other developing economies focused on the garment industry (e.g., Vietnam, Cambodia, and Ethiopia BGMEA 2016) . Therefore, the empirical findings that working condition risks in supplier factories are negatively associated with supplier trustworthiness in the garment industry provide strong incentives for government to support supplier factories in improving working conditions. Remediation efforts for addressing working condition risks in Bangladesh garment factories are estimated to average between $250,000-$350,000 per factory (Alliance 2015) , and financial support for such efforts is often necessary. Through provisions of low-interest credit and loans, local government can not only signal their explicit support for the industry but also encourage supplier factories to proactively engage in carrying out improvements in working conditions. Further, such interventions can help raise the overall working conditions in factories industry-wide, and also attract greater foreign direct investment (Kucera 2002 ).
Limitations and Concluding Remarks
Our study has limitations that can also serve as avenues for future research. First, our study focuses solely on the RMG industry in Bangladesh. More research is needed to determine if the study findings and implications may be extended to factories in different industries (e.g., high-tech manufacturing) or geographical regions (e.g., garment manufacturing in other developing nations). Such extensions would add greater depth to our understanding of the conditions and contexts for integration between corporate social responsibility and global sourcing. Second, while inspection reports from Alliance and Accord currently provide cross-sectional data on working condition risks within Bangladesh's RMG factories, we believe that further evolution of corporate social responsibility practices and transparency in this context can enable future studies to develop deeper insights into the causal nature of the studied relationships. A third limitation of our study is that our measure of supplier trustworthiness does not account for variations in scale and scope of the contract across buyers. Future studies would benefit from collecting more granular data on the size and the nature of buyer-supplier contracts in studying the effects of working condition risks. Finally, in this study, we examine corporate social responsibility from the buyers' perspective. A future line of research could examine the role of suppliers and their actions in the working conditions improvement process. Specifically, future studies can explore innovative ways through which suppliers can actively collaborate with buyers to improve working conditions in their factories, or whether a "backfiring condition" is necessary for buyers to motivate suppliers to do so, as suggested by Plambeck and Taylor (2015, p. 1).
Notwithstanding the above limitations, this study provides new, theoretically grounded empirical insights into innovative and impactful approaches to improve working conditions in supplier factories in developing countries. These factories are an integral part of the global supply chains. Their importance to their workers and to global business should motivate scholars to pursue this consequential line of inquiry.
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A.1.2. Alternative Measures of Factory Size
We collected additional data and explored potential surrogate measures relating to factory size.
Specifically, we identify three additional variables related to the supplier factories that are correlated with factory size (as shown in Table A -2 below), and can be used as controls for various aspects of factory size:
number of machines, factory square footage, and number of floors/stories associated with the factory. As shown in Table A -3, results with inclusion of these additional variables (Models M3b, M3c, M3d and M4) are consistent with the original findings regarding the effects of factory size (M3a). A-2 
A.1.3. Additional Robustness Checks
We normalized the count measures of working condition risks by factory size to ensure comparability of the measures across the sample. While normalization allows us to investigate the main effects of working condition risks, it does not allow us to examine the interaction effects associated with the risks here. As the results in Table A -4 indicate, the coefficients of the main effects of working condition risks on supplier trustworthiness are consistent with those from the main analysis, highlighting the robustness of our analysis. A-3 Additionally, we carried out analyses by splitting the sample into quartiles based on the factory size variable to reduce unobserved heterogeneity effects associated with factory size. While such an approach results in a considerable reduction of sample size for each quartile, the results of this analysis shown in Table A -5 below are qualitatively consistent with the main analysis results. Specifically, from smaller factories to larger factories, we observe that the magnitude of the negative main effect for electrical risk is reduced from (-0.22 to 0), although its interactions with factory size are no longer significant in each group (but still positive). This result is consistent with our results that larger factories have less impact from electrical risks. Further, the main effects for fire risk have negative signs but are only marginally significant in small and medium factory size groups. Its interaction effects are positive and significant in medium to larger factory groups. To check the possible U-shaped relationship between supplier factory size and supplier trustworthiness, we conducted an additional robustness check that includes the quadratic term of size in our main analysis. The results from M1 and M2 in Table A-6 and A-4
Figure A-1 show that factory size has significant effects for both the main and quadratic terms.
However, the effect is not U-shaped, but rather, inverted U-shaped. We further check how the quadratic term interacts with working condition risks. We find it has significant positive interaction with fire and electrical risk, which is consistent with our main analysis, and that the U-shaped relationship is observed for high-risk factories. To defend our linear relationship argument, we carefully check the range of the quadratic effect. In the feasible range of factory size, there is a general increasing trend and the center line is close to the maximum value for factory size. Such a trend holds for both high-risk (+2 sd from the mean) and low-risk (-2 sd from the mean) factories. The Number of Buyers for a supplier may have a limitation in its ability to fully reflect the notion of trustworthiness, and data on order quantities (volume) and the monetary value associated with each buyer would have been useful. To that regard, our follow up with Alliance and Accord indicated that such data are not collected by either consortium. Nonetheless, we collected additional data on Corrective Actions Plans (CAPs) that tracks the progress made by a supplier factory in terms of the percentage of violation issues corrected by the factory during a follow-up inspection. This data is only provided by Accord.
While Accord members attempt to provide financial assistance to supplier factories for corrective actions (that typically range from $250,000-350,000 per factory (Accord 2015) ), it can be argued that the extent of progress made by a supplier is likely to be indicative of supplier attitudes and motivation toward following up on commitments made to buyers on remediation efforts.
Taking this information into account, we created a composite revised measure of supplier trustworthiness, a formative measure that comprises both: i) number of buyers, and ii) percentage of issues corrected. As shown in Table A -7, the results of analysis with this new variable are largely consistent with the main analysis in the manuscript, thereby highlighting the robustness of our dependent variable measure. 
